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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is a follow-up to a previous article, Networks of Fairness
Review in Corporate Law (Fairness).1 After an overview of the fundamentals
of the fairness standard and network theory, Fairness deployed network
and statistical analyses to conduct an empirical study of the fairness
doctrine as articulated by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware
Court of Chancery.2 It sought to address three questions: (1) whether the

* Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law.
1. See Reza Dibadj, Networks of Fairness Review in Corporate Law, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Dibadj, Fairness].
2. The Delaware Court of Chancery is the court of first instance for corporate
matters. See Welcome to the Delaware Court of Chancery, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Court%20of%20Chancery/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). Delaware, of course, is the leading
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putatively shareholder-friendly fairness standard actually helped plaintiffs;
(2) whether the different articulations of the fairness standard—“entire
fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and “inherent fairness”—reflect articulable
differences; and (3) whether fairness cases exhibit a network topology
where a disproportionately small number of cases (“hubs”) garner a
disproportionately large number of citations. With respect to these three
questions, Fairness concluded that: (1) In more than half of the cases,
supposedly plaintiff-friendly precedent was interpreted in a defendantfriendly manner;3 (2) the jurisprudence is not precise enough to inform
different standards of fairness;4 and (3) fairness case law exhibits a
highly skewed distribution.5
This initial analysis focused on the fairness standard for one principal
reason: It is considered to be the most plaintiff-friendly standard of
review, in marked distinction to the well-known business judgment rule
(BJR)6 where the defendant is virtually guaranteed to win.7 But there are
also four other prominent standards of heightened scrutiny in Delaware
jurisprudence, each of which purports to protect plaintiffs beyond the
BJR: Unocal/Unitrin, with respect to defensive measures in the face of
change-in-control transactions;8 Revlon, in the context of auctioning a
change-in-control;9 Blasius, where the shareholder franchise might have
been violated;10 and the Zapata “two-step,” which sometimes requires a
court to exercise its business judgment in the context of pre-suit demand.11
Despite the intuition of commentators that such standards get watered
down,12 these standards had yet to be explored in a systematic fashion.
jurisdiction in matters of corporate law. See Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 474 (2005) [hereinafter Dibadj, Delayering].
3. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 15–22.
4. See id. at 22–26.
5. See id. at 26–28.
6. The BJR presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis . . . and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
7. There is one prominent case where the Delaware Supreme Court found
directors to have violated the BJR. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del.
1985).
8. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371–75 (Del. 1995);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
9. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986).
10. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
11. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981).
12. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Daedalean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1262
(2006) (“Unocal was slowly eroded through lax application. Revlon was narrowed.”);
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1189, 1204 (2002) (“Subsequent Delaware cases have dramatically reduced Revlon’s
significance by making clear that if the directors of the firm decide not to sell, or if they
prefer a stock-for-stock exchange with another public firm, Revlon is irrelevant.”).
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Building on the work in Fairness, this Article seeks to perform a
network analysis of these heightened standards of review. The discussion is
structured into three principal sections. Part II outlines what these
standards of review are and what they purport to do. Part III describes
the empirical methods used—from data gathering to analysis to the
display of results. It culminates in four network maps, one for each
standard. Finally, Part IV considers the implications of the analysis with
a focus on whether these heightened standards offer more than rhetorical
solace to shareholder-plaintiffs.
II. STANDARDS OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
State corporation codes, notably the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL), consist largely of default provisions. They are “enabling”
statutes.13 As a consequence, much of the mandatory content of corporate
law is articulated through courts expounding upon the fiduciary duties
that corporate insiders have toward shareholders. 14 As one Delaware
jurist put it, “The ‘flesh and blood’ of corporate law is judge-made. It is
the common law formulation of principles of fiduciary duties articulated
on a case-by-case basis.”15 Judges analyze fiduciary duties using various
standards of review; after all, a “judicial standard of review is a valueladen analytical instrument that . . . describes the task a court performs in
determining whether action by corporate directors violated their
fiduciary duty.”16 In theory, the stricter the standard, the more likely a

13. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant
for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 216 (2005) (“State
corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu approach that permits firms to
alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.”).
14. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 859, 861 (2001) (“[W]hat emerged as a counterpoint to the evolution of the
enabling model of corporation law [statutes] was the second key function of the law of
corporations: the ex post judicial review of the actions of corporate officers and directors,
measured by fiduciary principles.”).
15. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005).
16. Allen et al., supra note 14, at 867.

3

DIBADJ.UPDATEPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:12:22 AM

court should question the behavior of the defendant-insiders and find for
plaintiff-shareholders.17
The strictness of standards of review is bounded at one end by the BJR
and at the other end by fairness. The BJR is not an interesting standard
of review upon which to conduct an empirical analysis of case outcomes
for the simple reason that defendants are virtually guaranteed to win.18
The other extreme is fairness analysis—variously called “inherent fairness,”
“intrinsic fairness,” or most commonly “entire fairness.”19 While one
might expect decisions that recognize fairness analysis to be friendly to
plaintiffs, the empirical analysis in Fairness suggests that in the majority
of cases where the fairness standards were discussed, the standard ended
up not helping plaintiffs—either because the standard was deemed met
by the defendants or because the standard was held inapplicable in the
particular factual situation.20
But beyond BJR and fairness, what about other standards of review?
Between these two poles remain four other standards of heightened
scrutiny, as embodied in five seminal Delaware cases: Unocal/Unitrin,
Revlon, Blasius, and Zapata. Though well familiar to students of corporate
law, the standard articulated in each case is nonetheless worth a brief
explanation.
The Unocal/Unitrin standard focuses on what standard of review
should apply to determine whether the actions of an incumbent board to
ward off an insurgent’s attempted takeover pass judicial muster.21
Noting the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in

17. See id. at 869 (“[S]tandards of review reflect significant value judgments about
the social utility of permitting greater or lesser insulation of director conduct from
judicial scrutiny.”).
18. As Delaware jurists themselves explain, the BJR “is not, functionally speaking,
a standard of review at all. Rather, it is an expression of a policy of non-review of a
board of directors’ decision when a judge has already performed the crucial task of
determining that certain conditions exist.” Id. at 870.
19. The fairness standard applies:
[I]f the challenged transaction arises in a context of self-dealing; that is, if the
corporate fiduciaries have stood on both sides of the transaction and approved
its terms. In that setting, because the fiduciaries charged with protecting the
interest of the public shareholders have a conflicting self interest, those
fiduciaries must establish the transaction’s “entire fairness” to the satisfaction
of the reviewing court.
Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988).
20. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 15–22.
21. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985)
(“Did the Unocal board have the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat it
reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise, and if so, is its action
here entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule?”).

4

DIBADJ.UPDATEPRINTER

[VOL. 46: 1, 2009]

3/12/2009 10:12:22 AM

Networks of Heightened Scrutiny
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders,”22
the Delaware Supreme Court went on to hold that:
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails an
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the
corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the
price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact
on “constituencies” other than shareholders ([that is], creditors, customers, employees,
and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.23

This is the famous Unocal proportionality review, well-known to students
of corporate law.24 Ten years later, Unitrin purportedly sought to clarify
the Unocal standard. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the
Court of Chancery erred in applying the proportionality review Unocal
requires by focusing upon whether the Repurchase Program [defensive
maneuver used by incumbent board] was an “unnecessary” defensive response.
The Court of Chancery should have directed its enhanced scrutiny: first,
upon whether the Repurchase Program the Unitrin Board implemented was
draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive and; second, if it was not
draconian, upon whether it was within a range of reasonable responses to the
threat American General’s Offer posed.25

Note how, through Unitrin, the Unocal standard becomes more
defendant-friendly. After all, the defensive maneuver no longer needs to
be proportional—as long as it is not “draconian” and roughly reasonable,
then it will pass muster.26
22. Id. at 954.
23. Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
24. The second prong of the Unocal test—namely, analysis “within the ambit of
the business judgment rule”—is puzzling and perhaps superfluous. After all, as one
court has noted, “the application of the business judgment rule is really a conclusion that
the board’s action was appropriate because no board resolution can withstand the
enhanced scrutiny of Unocal and then prove to be irrational under the business judgment
rule.” In re Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483, at
*5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994).
25. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). See also id. at 1388 (“[I]f the board of directors’ defensive
response is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a ‘range of reasonableness,’ a
court must not substitute its judgment for the board’s.”).
26. This transition might seem a logical stretch. Perhaps recognizing this concern,
the Unitrin court attempts to justify its position by stating that “[a]n examination of the
cases applying Unocal reveals a direct correlation between findings of proportionality or
disproportionality and the judicial determination of whether a defensive response was
draconian because it was either coercive or preclusive in character.” Id. at 1387. Cf. id.
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One might next usefully conceive of Revlon and Blasius as special
applications of the general principles discussed in Unocal/Unitrin. In
Revlon, where “the break-up of the company”27 was imminent, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that:
Selective dealing to fend off a hostile but determined bidder was no longer a
proper objective. Instead, obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the
stockholders should have been the central theme guiding director action. . . .
[C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among
active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain
the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.28

Put more colloquially, when a company is in “Revlon-land,” the board
has a duty to auction the company to the highest bidder. For its part, in
Blasius the Delaware Court of Chancery emphasized the “transcending
significance of the franchise to the claims to legitimacy of our scheme of
corporate governance.”29 More importantly for our purposes, it held that
where a board takes “action designed for the primary purpose of
interfering with the effectiveness of a stockholder vote,”30 then “the
board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification
for such action.”31
Finally, there is Zapata, which is a different creature. In the context
of the often esoteric details of the procedural posture of derivative suits,
the Zapata court asked “[w]hen, if at all, should an authorized board
committee be permitted to cause litigation, properly initiated by a
derivative stockholder in his own right, to be dismissed?”32 Recognizing
the potential for members of the committee to be sympathetic to their
colleagues on the board,33 Zapata announced its now famous two-part
test:
at 1373 (“The enhanced judicial scrutiny mandated by Unocal is not intended to lead to a
structured, mechanistic, mathematical exercise.”).
27. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988).
30. Id. at 659.
31. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
32. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981). The technical
term for such a committee is the “Special Litigation Committee,” or SLC, which is:
[A] committee of one or more directors appointed by the board of directors of
a Delaware corporation as a whole to evaluate the desirability of maintaining a
derivative suit which has been brought on the corporation’s behalf by a
shareholder without a demand having first been made on the board to take such
action.
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 504 (Del. Ch. 1984).
33. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787 (“[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing
judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members.”).
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First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. Limited discovery may be
ordered to facilitate such inquiries. The corporation should have the burden of
proving independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation, rather than
presuming independence, good faith and reasonableness.34

If the defendants do not meet this first step, then the court denies the
committee’s motion.35 If, however, the court finds “that the committee
was independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith findings
and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its discretion, to the
next step.”36 The second step, in turn, provides:
[T]he essential key in striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims
as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation’s best interests as
expressed by an independent investigating committee. The Court should determine,
applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be
granted. This means, of course, that instances could arise where a committee
can establish its independence and sound bases for its good faith decisions and
still have the corporation’s motion denied.37

This test, sometimes informally called the “Zapata two-step,” is especially
notable for its second prong—a unique expression in Delaware
jurisprudence where the court is asked to exercise its own business
judgment.
Building upon the framework first articulated in Fairness, this Article
seeks to perform an empirical analysis of the cases that comprise these
four standards of heightened scrutiny to address the following principal
question:
(1) Do cases that discuss these heightened standards of review
actually employ these standards to help plaintiffs?
As in Fairness, a secondary and more mechanical question also emerges:38
(2) Does the case law that has evolved around these heightened
standards exhibit a skewed distribution?
Before discussing the results, however, it is important to outline the
empirical methods through which the analysis has been conducted.
34. Id. at 788.
35. See id. at 789.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
38. Fairness discussed a third question surrounding the linguistic consistency of
the adjectives inherent, intrinsic, and entire. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 22–
26. This question is inapplicable in the context of the standards analyzed in this Article.
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III. EMPIRICAL METHODS
To address these two questions, this Article performs an empirical
analysis of Delaware cases that discuss the Unocal/Unitrin, Revlon,
Blasius, and Zapata standards. As with empirical work generally, three
steps frame the effort: gathering the data, analyzing it, and displaying the
results.
First, a universe of cases was defined and its features collected.
References to these five cases were searched in all opinions of the
Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware Court of Chancery that are
available electronically on LexisNexis.39 Cases that did not entail the
judicial review of fiduciary duties of corporate insiders were excluded.40
For each case, two subsets of data are collected. The first set helps to
describe the case itself: its name, the date it was decided, the courts that
decided it, whether the portion of the opinion referring to Unocal/
Unitrin, Revlon, Blasius, or Zapata helped the plaintiff or the defendant,41
and the phase of litigation during which the opinion arose.42 A case that
discusses more than one standard appears separately in the analysis for
each standard.43 Table 1 provides an overview of the universe of cases
analyzed.
TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF CASES
Cases
Del. Supreme
Court
Del. Court of
Chancery
Total
Years

Unocal/Unitrin

Revlon

26

19%

16

14%

7

12%

6

20%

108

81%

101

86%

51

88%

24

80%

134

100%

117

100%

58

100%

30

100%

1985–2008

1985–2008

Blasius

1988–2008

Zapata

1981–2008

39. More specifically, the Author combined the “DE Supreme Court Cases from
1790” and “DE Court of Chancery Cases from 1814” libraries. Of course, the most
recent cases that actually employ one of the standards date from the 1980s. See Table 1.
40. Notably, are instances where the cases were referenced in the context of class
certifications, settlements, or unincorporated associations.
41. The cases that are defendant-friendly are subdivided into two categories: those
in which the court noted that the standard of heightened scrutiny is inapplicable, and
those in which the standard was held applicable but met by the defendants.
42. For instance, the phase of litigation requires determining whether the case
concerns a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, a motion to dismiss,
summary judgment, or a decision after trial.
43. For example, a case that discusses both Revlon and Unocal/Unitrin will appear
once in each analysis.
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This table accords with intuition along both its horizontal and vertical
dimensions: Those familiar with Delaware jurisprudence will recognize
Unocal/Unitrin and Revlon jurisprudence as more common than the
more esoteric Blasius and Zapata standards, as well as the fact that the
Chancery Court adjudicates the bulk of corporate law cases.44
The second subset of data describes the interrelationships among cases
by creating an N x N matrix45 for each standard that lists the cases both
vertically and horizontally. Every time a case in a row cites another case
as part of its analysis of the relevant standard of review, an indication is
made in the column corresponding to the cited case.46
Once the data has been gathered, the second step is to analyze it. As
discussed in some detail in Fairness, network theory has enjoyed recent
successes in conceptualizing the topology of systems in the physical and
social sciences, but has so far been vastly underutilized in the law.47 The
underlying principle behind network theory is surprisingly simple: to
understand the relationships among entities, be they, for example, people,
countries, or molecules.48 The theory has already made inroads into
scientific discourse;49 it is only beginning to emerge as a tool in legal
analysis.50 Put simply, legal actors or cases might occupy nodes and be
44. See, e.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 15, at 1401 (“Delaware
corporate jurisprudence is authoritatively framed, in part, by a discrete number of
decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court. It is also framed, in part, by a plethora of
Delaware Court of Chancery decisions . . . .”).
45. N, of course, represents the total number of cases within each of the four
standards: 134 for Unocal/Unitrin, 117 for Revlon, 58 for Blasius, and 30 for Zapata.
46. More than half of the cells in the matrix will necessarily remain empty: The
diagonal is empty because a case cannot refer to itself; moreover, a case cannot refer to a
case that occurs later in time.
47. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 7–11.
48. See, e.g., James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring
the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324,
325 (2007) (“At its core, network analysis maps and measures relationships between, for
example, people, groups, computers, or information.”).
49. See, e.g., M. Girvan & M. E. J. Newman, Community Structure in Social and
Biological Networks, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7821 (2002); Steven H. Strogatz,
Exploring Complex Networks, 410 NATURE 268 (2001).
50. Pioneering publications include David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long
is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 545 (2000) and Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
309 (2007). There are also some innovative working papers on the application of
network theory to law. See, e.g., Seth J. Chandler, The Network Structure of Supreme
Court Jurisprudence (Univ. Houston Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, Paper No.
2005-W-01, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=742065; James H. Fowler &
Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16 (2008);
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connected to each other via arcs. The ensuing graph represents the topology,
or configuration, of the network, thus providing a visual representation
of aspects of the law in a way that can fruitfully complement the gridlike outlines with which all lawyers are familiar.
The advantages of network theory aside, there is a practical difficulty
in that spreadsheets and other conventional software programs are
unfortunately not designed for network analysis. As a consequence, the
data in the spreadsheet was reformatted and fed into Pajek, specialized
software designed to analyze large-scale networks.51 The topology of
the network is specified by two data subsets: The first supplies the
characteristics of the nodes (vertices) in the network; the second defines
the arcs (lines) emanating from citing case to cited case. Pajek processes
these data points and generates graphs, as well as some mathematical
metrics that capture the principal features of the network.
Third, and finally, the network analysis needs to be displayed in a
user-friendly manner. To try to achieve aesthetically pleasing images,
the output of the network analysis was fed into specialized graphical
software52 able to generate graphs in scalable vector graphics (SVG).53
The results of these efforts are represented visually using four network
diagrams, one for each of the four standards.54 A circular node,
proportional in size to the frequency with which it is cited, represents
each case. Nodes are color coded: Blue nodes represent cases where the
analysis of the heightened standard was employed in a plaintiff-friendly
manner; red or yellow nodes, where the heightened standard was used to
support a defendant-friendly conclusion. Yellow denotes situations where a
standard of heightened scrutiny was discussed but not applied; red,
where the court applied a standard of heightened scrutiny, but
determined that the defendants had met it.
Interrelationships among cases are shown using arcs. Black lines
depict citations, with a directional arrow from citing case to cited case.
For the sake of completeness, the network diagrams also include light

Daniel Martin Katz & Derek Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of
the American Federal Judiciary (Univ. Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 83, 2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art83.
51. Pajek, developed at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, has emerged as a
leading network analysis package. See Pajek Wiki, http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php (last
visited Feb. 6, 2009).
52. Unfortunately, the graphical output from the network analysis software is
difficult to read. For example, diagrams are off-center and have awkward aspect ratios.
53. Traditional bitmap images that are readable by most Windows based programs
cannot be accurately scaled to different display sizes. As a consequence, SVG images
were generated and outputted to the familiar portable document format (PDF).
54. Figure 1 displays Unocal/Unitrin, Figure 2 Revlon, Figure 3 Blasius, and Figure 4
Zapata. See infra pp. 17–18.
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grey lines to depict arcs citing cases that themselves do not discuss the
standard in question but which articulate principles upon which the
citing case relies on in its analysis of the standard—perhaps predictably,
the latter cases tend to be older cases predating the heightened standard,
but grappling with kindred issues.55
The graphs (Figures 1–4) depict a two-dimensional network layout as
generated using the Kamada-Kawai spring embedder algorithm, familiar
to network analysts.56 Insights into the two questions that drive this
Article emerge from these graphs and the metrics generated by the
network analysis software.
IV. FINDINGS
At this point, it is perhaps worth repeating the two questions that drive
this Article:
(1) Do cases that discuss these heightened standards of review
actually employ these standards to help plaintiffs?
(2) Does the case law that has evolved around these heightened
standards exhibit a skewed distribution?
This Part addresses each question.
A. Do Standards of Heightened Scrutiny Actually Help Plaintiffs?
This Article addresses this question using both basic statistics and
visual inspection of the network topologies. Each source provides a set
of insights.
First, and most simply, the number of cases in which courts used
standards of heightened scrutiny in a plaintiff-friendly manner can be
compared to those in which courts discussed fairness standards but
where the standard ended up not helping the plaintiff. This latter
category is further subdivided into two subcategories: cases in which the
standard was discussed but not applied and cases in which the standard

55. These cases, linked to the network via light grey lines, are not included in the
statistical analyses because they are not cases that themselves have deployed the standard
in question. They are included, however, in the network maps, so the reader will be able
to see not only the network of cases specifically analyzing the heightened standard but
also the cases upon which these cases have relied.
56. For a discussion of Kamada-Kawai, see WOUTER DE NOOY ET AL., EXPLORATORY
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 16–17 (2005).
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was applied and deemed met by the defendants. Table 2a provides a
summary of the outcomes.
TABLE 2A
CASE OUTCOMES
Outcome
Plaintiff-friendly

Unocal/Unitrin
35
26%

Revlon
20
17%

Blasius
14
24%

Zapata
7
23%

Defendant-friendly
Standard not applied
Standard applied and met
Total defendant-friendly

46
36
82

34%
27%
61%

45
46
91

38%
39%
78%

27
7
34

47%
12%
59%

8
4
12

27%
13%
40%

Neither

17

13%

6

5%

10

17%

11

37%

Consistently across standards, discussion of the standard ended up
helping the plaintiffs only about a fifth to a quarter of the time, in a tight
band ranging from seventeen percent for Revlon to twenty-six percent
for Unocal/Unitrin. Also, except for the relatively few cases comprising
the Zapata standard, a majority of the cases discussing the other
standards ended up not helping the plaintiffs.57 As one might expect,
given that fairness is considered to be the most plaintiff-friendly
standard,58 these standards of heightened scrutiny look even bleaker for
plaintiffs. By comparison, consider that in thirty-eight percent of entire
fairness cases, the standard was used in a plaintiff-friendly manner,
whereas in fifty-three percent of the cases it was used in a defendantfriendly manner.59
Table 2a also shows the defendant-friendly cases split into two
subcategories. The first, and most prevalent, is for the court to note that the
standard is inapplicable. For example, a court might argue that Blasius does
not apply because the primary motive of the board was not to impede the
shareholder franchise.60 Or, a court might argue that Revlon duties are

57. And even the Zapata standard only ended up helping plaintiffs 23% of the
time. The big difference is the relatively large percentage of cases (37%) that mention
the Zapata two-step, but end up not takings sides—most often, the court is simply
expounding on what the standard means. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
807, 813–14 (Del. 1984).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
59. “Entire fairness” is the predominant label under which fairness cases are
decided, comprising 335 out of 442 (76%) of fairness cases. The pattern for fairness
cases overall is strikingly similar: 38% are plaintiff-friendly whereas 53% are defendantfriendly. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 15.
60. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) (“We can find
no evidence to support Williams’ claim that the Defendants’ primary purpose in adopting
the Recapitalization was a desire to impede the Milacron stockholders’ vote.”); Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 285 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“In any event,
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not relevant because there is no breakup of the company61 or change in
control.62 Similarly, Unocal can be conveniently sidestepped by concluding
that there is no threat.63 A more general technique is simply to note that
these standards of heightened review are nothing special, and then proceed
to basic duty of loyalty analysis.64 Along these lines, Vice Chancellor
Blasius is distinguishable because I am unable to find, on the present record, that the
primary purpose of the Management Transactions was to interfere with a stockholder
vote.”); Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 496 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“Our case law
clearly establishes that board action of this kind, when taken as a defensive measure
against a hostile tender offer coupled with a proxy contest, does not implicate the Blasius
standard of review.”).
61. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989) (“If, however, the board’s reaction to a hostile tender offer is found to constitute
only a defensive response and not an abandonment of the corporation’s continued
existence, Revlon duties are not triggered . . . .”); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“But Revlon duties arise only where
circumstances make it inevitable that the company will be sold to one of the bidders
competing to acquire it. That is not the situation here.”).
62. The language to elude Revlon duties emphasizes whether shareholders will
have a say after the transaction. As one court observes:
Delaware law also requires that once a change of control of a company is
inevitable the board must assume the role of an auctioneer in order to
maximize shareholder value. This duty, however, does not apply to stock-forstock strategic mergers of publicly traded companies, a majority of the stock of
which is dispersed in the market.
Krim v. Pronet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 527 (Del. Ch. 1999) (footnote omitted). Similarly,
in the words of another opinion:
Delaware law requires that once a change of control of a company is inevitable
the board must assume the role of an auctioneer in order to maximize
shareholder value. There is a “change of control” if shareholders lose a further
opportunity to participate in a change of control premium.
This duty, however, does not apply to situations where control of the
company rests with a single controlling shareholder instead of the public. It is
not appropriate to extend the so-called Revlon duties to that circumstance because
public shareholders have no control premium and no opportunity to lose.
McMullin v. Beran, No. 16493, 1999 WL 1135146, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 1999) (footnotes
omitted).
63. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985)
(“[H]ere we have a defensive mechanism adopted to ward off possible future advances
and not a mechanism adopted in reaction to a specific threat. . . . [I]n reviewing a preplanned defensive mechanism it seems even more appropriate to apply the business
judgment rule.”); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 79 (Del. 1992) (“We agree that Unocal
was inapplicable. The board was not under a threat to its control and its decision to
recommend the Amendments to the shareholders was not defensive.”).
64. For example, as the Chancery Court has recently observed:
Once a board of directors determines to sell the corporation in a change of
control transaction, its responsibility is to endeavor to secure the highest value
reasonably attainable for the stockholders. This obligation is a contextuallyspecific application of the directors’ duty to act in accordance with their
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Leo Strine’s recent observations are telling. For example, in a recent
case, he underlined that “some of the prior Unocal case law gave reason
to fear that that standard, and the related Revlon standard, were being
denuded into simply another name for business judgment rule review.”65
Similarly, in the context of Blasius analysis, he observed that:
[T]he trigger for the test’s application—director action that has the primary
purpose of disenfranchisement—is so pejorative that it is more a label for a
result than a useful guide to determining what standard of review should be
used by a judge to reach an appropriate result. As a result, decisions in the wake
of Blasius tended to involve threshold exertions in reasoning as to why director
action influencing the ability of stockholders to act did not amount to
disenfranchisement, thus obviating the need to apply Blasius at all.66

The second, less common, method is for a court to acknowledge the
applicability of the standard but then argue that it has been met. The
shift from Unocal to Unitrin, for instance, makes this quite convenient:
It is much easier to argue that the incumbent board has not been
“draconian” than to argue the “proportionality” of its response.67
Another is to emphasize the discretion Zapata putatively gives judges as
to whether to apply the second step,68 and then simply side with the
defendants after the first step.69
A further inquiry involves asking whether these results depend upon
the phase of litigation. To address this question, cases were categorized
into four phases: preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and post trial.70 Table 2b summarizes
the results.

fiduciary obligations, and there is no single blueprint that a board must follow
to fulfill its duties. Rather, the board’s actions must be evaluated in light of the
relevant circumstances to determine whether they were undertaken with due
diligence and in good faith.
Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, 864 A.2d 80, 85 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(footnotes omitted). See also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001)
(“In our view, Revlon neither creates a new type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control
context nor alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally apply.”).
65. Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810 (Del. Ch. 2007) (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 806 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
67. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. This position, of course,
conveniently ignores the court’s emphasis that the second step provides “the essential
key in striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a derivative
stockholder suit and a corporation’s best interests as expressed by an independent
investigating committee.” Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
69. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 520 (Del. Ch. 1984) (“I find it
unnecessary to proceed to the discretionary, second-step analysis authorized by Zapata.”).
70. Zapata cases are not analyzed in this fashion for the simple reason that they
virtually all concern a motion to dismiss in the context of derivative litigation.
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TABLE 2B
CASES BY PHASE
Phase

Unocal/Unitrin

Revlon

Blasius

Preliminary injunction

66

49%

61

52%

19

33%

Motion to dismiss

31

23%

35

30%

10

17%

Summary judgment

19

14%

13

11%

13

22%

Post-trial

18

13%

8

7%

16

28%

As an aside, it is interesting to note the unusually large number of
preliminary injunction cases.71 This phenomenon is due to the fact that
these standards typically emerge in the context of impending mergers,
and by the time a merger is consummated, it is virtually impossible to
“unscramble the eggs.”72
Next, the statistical capabilities of the Pajek network analysis software
were used to see whether a statistically significant correlation between
phase and outcome exists. Rajski’s information indices were computed,
in both symmetrical and asymmetrical versions,73 with the results
displayed in Table 2c.

71. For example, the percentage of cases in the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment categories are similar in Fairness. However, the percentage of cases in the
preliminary injunction category is far less, with a concomitantly higher percentage in the
post-trial category. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 17.
72. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1348
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., No. 9173, 1987 WL
16285, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987) (“Given the great difficulty, and perhaps
practical impossibility, of returning a merged corporation to its original constituent
corporations, a preliminary injunction is the conventional remedy when a shareholder
establishes that a proposed merger is likely to be found to be in violation of law or of the
board’s fiduciary obligations.”).
73. As one book on network analysis summarizes the methodology:
Rajski’s indices measure the degree to which the information in one
classification is preserved in the other classification. It has three variants: a
symmetrical version (represented by C1C2) in the output of Pajek, and two
asymmetrical versions, which indicate the extent to which the first classification can
be predicted by the second (C1C2) or the second classification can be
predicted by the first (C1C2).
DE NOOY ET AL., supra note 56, at 50–51. Here, phase is denoted by C1 and outcome as
C2.
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TABLE 2C
RAJSKI’S INFORMATION INDICES
Unocal/Unitrin

Revlon

Blasius

Phase  Outcome

0.0270

0.0298

0.0398

Phase  Outcome
Phase  Outcome

0.0508
0.0546

0.0564
0.0594

0.0796
0.0736

Rajski’s indices are low, indicating that the outcomes are all but
independent of phase.74
Beyond statistical calculations, the network topologies offer additional
insight. First, visual inspection of the maps shows a large number of
defendant-friendly cases, as represented by yellow and red nodes. The
large nodes75 are, predictably enough, the canonical cases themselves
which gave birth to the standards—Unocal, Unitrin, Revlon, Blasius,
and Zapata—as well as important cases interpreting these standards,
such as Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.76 and
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.77 These hubs are the cases
discussed in a typical class on corporate law. Not discussed, however,
are the large number of relatively uncited defendant-friendly cases
which, in their aggregate, are what really tells us how useful each
standard might be to plaintiffs. Put simply, we do not talk about the
plethora of smaller red and yellow nodes which pepper the diagrams.
By focusing on the large nodes, perhaps we are missing the overall
picture.
From this analysis, it is fair to say that standards of heightened
scrutiny, unlike the business judgment rule where the defendant is
virtually guaranteed to win, are not outcome determinative. But, to an
even greater extent than fairness standards, they are far from plaintifffriendly.78 It is, of course, difficult to judge a priori the merits of each
individual case and the incentives to bring suit. However, the very fact
that heightened standards of review favor plaintiffs only a quarter to a
74. Tables A1–A3, which appear in the Appendix, provide more detail on case
outcomes by phase for each standard. These tables also suggest little correlation
between phase and outcome. See infra p. 26.
75. The size of the node is proportional to the number of citations it receives, or in
network parlance, its “indegree.”
76. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1993).
77. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
78. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
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fifth of the time seems instructive.79 Much like the standards explored in
Fairness, these standards of review can hardly be considered robust
checks on insider behavior.80 Given these results, the suggestion that
investors “seem to consider the Delaware courts’ decisions to be
inconsequential as regards shareholders’ wealth and, by implication,
largely indeterminate of the outcome of future cases,”81 seems soberingly
plausible. The bottom line is simple: Heightened standards of review
are of limited help to plaintiffs. A cynic might be forgiven for thinking
that, much like the fairness standards, they are little more than elegant
rhetorical flourish.
B. Does the Case Law Exhibit a Skewed Distribution?
The second question the analysis seeks to address is whether there are
disproportionately few cases that receive a disproportionate majority of
the citations, in a manner similar to findings in previous studies of legal
citation patterns.82 Interestingly, the results from analyzing legal systems
79. One might conceivably argue that the relevant cases are simply those where
the standard was applied in a plaintiff-friendly manner, versus those where the standard
was applied and met by the defendant. Under this analysis, 35 out of 71 (49%) of the
Unocal/Unitrin cases, 20 out of 66 (30%) of the Revlon cases, 14 out of 21 (67%) of the
Blasius cases, and 7 out of 11 (64%) of the Zapata cases would be plaintiff-friendly. See
supra Table 2a. However, this analysis does not capture the number of times the
putatively plaintiff-friendly standard was discussed but, conveniently for the defendant,
not applied. See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text.
80. These findings fit within the broader reality of limiting judicial review in
corporate law. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in
the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318 (2004) (“Over time,
state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in a manner that left little substance.”);
Dibadj, Delayering, supra note 2, at 532 (“[L]ost amid this sea of reform is one basic
and surprisingly overlooked fact: the traditional base of corporate law—fiduciary
obligations—has been eviscerated.”).
81. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A
Study of Investors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 603
(1987). See also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (“[W]e come much closer to
understanding the role of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as preachers
than as policemen.”).
82. See, e.g., Post & Eisen, supra note 50, at 570–79 (providing citation analysis
of cases by New York Court of Appeals and United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit finding a very small number of cases receiving a disproportionate
number of citations, whereas the majority of cases were cited very infrequently); Frank
B. Cross et al., The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law 10 (June 2006),
available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=909217 (“The distribution of citation references is
highly skewed. Only two percent of the total number of decided [United States Supreme

19

DIBADJ.UPDATEPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:12:22 AM

are consistent with those of scientists studying physical phenomena;
namely, that “some nodes are more highly connected than others are. . . .
[T]here are a few nodes with many links.”83 Across these applications, a
standard measure in network theory measures this phenomenon simply
and elegantly: “indegree,” which calculates the number of citations
(arcs) a case (node) receives.84
Unsurprisingly, the indegree of nodes within each of the four networks
reveals a highly skewed pattern. For example, 96 of the 134 Unocal/
Unitrin cases, 84 of the 117 Revlon cases (72%), 40 of the 58 Blasius
cases (69%), and 19 out of the 30 Zapata cases (63%) receive one or
fewer citations. By contrast, across all four networks, the top 5% of
cases receive approximately half of the citations. Figures 5a through 5d
present the results graphically.
The results are consistent with those in Fairness: Though the network
topologies were slightly more skewed there,85 overall patterns are strikingly
similar.
Inspecting the network maps themselves confirms the statistical analyses.
There exists a small number of highly cited cases (large vertices) and a
large number of cases that are either never or rarely cited (small vertices).
Network theorists call these highly cited cases “hubs.” There is one
subtle difference, however, with the fairness topologies. In Fairness, the
famous plaintiff-friendly hubs (blue vertices) tended to overshadow
the large number of uncited or rarely cited defendant-friendly cases
(yellow and red vertices). Put another way, the overall topology of the
networks was more defendant-friendly than their hubs would suggest.86
In the present analysis, however, while the overall network topologies
are clearly defendant-friendly, very often the hub cases are defendantfriendly as well. This difference is largely driven by the fact that
several of the seminal cases articulating these heightened standards of
Court] cases receives fifty-six percent of all citations in the network. Roughly 28,000
cases [out of 47,869] have been cited only once.”).
83. Strogatz, supra note 49, at 274. These networks typically exhibit what
mathematicians call “power-law” distributions where a small number of nodes have many
arcs connecting them to other nodes, but the vast majority of nodes have exponentially
fewer connections. Theorists often label these networks as “‘scale-free,’ by analogy with
fractals, phase transitions, and other situations where power laws arise and no single
characteristic scale can be defined.” Id. See also Post & Eisen, supra note 50, at 551–
52, 568.
84. See DE NOOY ET AL., supra note 56, at 189 (“The popularity or indegree of a
vertex is the number of arcs it receives in a directed network.”).
85. Eighty-nine percent of the inherent fairness cases, eighty-one percent of the
intrinsic fairness cases, and seventy-two percent of the entire fairness cases received one
or fewer citations. The top 5% of cases in these fairness networks received from 39%–
61% of the citations, respectively. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 26.
86. See id. at 19–21.
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Figure 5a: Indegree - Unocal/Unitrin
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Figure 5c: Indegree - Blasius
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Figure 5d: Indegree - Zapata
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review—notably Unocal and Unitrin—actually ended up using their newly
articulated standards in a defendant-friendly manner.87
More broadly, both statistical and visual analyses confirm that Unocal/
Unitrin, Revlon, Blasius, and Zapata networks display a highly skewed
distribution similar to that found in other network studies.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article completes a two part series of articles that analyze the
network topologies of Delaware corporate law. The present Article and
Fairness, combined, have covered every major standard of heightened
scrutiny: fairness—inherent, intrinsic, and entire; proportionality morphed
into coerciveness and preclusiveness from Unocal to Unitrin; auctions
under Revlon; compelling justifications under Blasius; and the Zapata
two-step.
The results reveal several important patterns. First, and most technically,
citation patterns in Delaware corporate law seem to exhibit a highly skewed
distribution where a small number of cases are disproportionately cited
and the bulk of the cases remain obscure. Perhaps reassuringly, this
finding is consistent with that found across a number of emerging network
studies. Second, the courts are not always linguistically consistent.
Although this analysis is not relevant to the current study, Fairness showed
that courts often use the terms “intrinsic,” “inherent,” and “entire” fairness
inconsistently. It then hypothesized that these extra adjectives perhaps
give a false sense of doctrinal precision and an allure of plaintifffriendliness which belies the empirical reality.88 Third, and by far most
significantly, these two articles have shown that even purportedly
plaintiff-friendly standards actually end up not helping plaintiffs most of
the time. To be sure, they are kinder to plaintiffs than the BJR, where
the defendant is virtually guaranteed to win, but they are far from
outcome determinative.
While the project has hopefully achieved the goals with which it set
out, more research could possibly lie ahead. One path would be to analyze
the skewed distributions across the seven networks that represent

87. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985)
(“On this record we are satisfied that the [defensive] device Unocal adopted is
reasonable in relation to the threat posed, and that the board acted in the proper exercise
of sound business judgment.”).
88. See Dibadj, Fairness, supra note 1, at 22–26.
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heightened scrutiny in Delaware corporate law—inherent fairness,
intrinsic fairness, entire fairness, Unocal/Unitrin, Revlon, Blasius, and
Zapata—to determine whether they represent power law distributions or
other highly skewed formations.89 Perhaps more significantly, creating
network maps of Delaware’s jurisprudence has required the creation of a
series of matrices that categorize the characteristics of cases and their
interdependencies. This rich data set presents a wealth of possibilities,
including the creation of graphical animations of how these networks
have evolved over time. More generally, matrices lend themselves well
to the techniques of linear algebra, suggesting that more insight might
emerge from advanced mathematical analyses of the data set. And,
needless to say, network theory, especially when it is combined with
basic statistical analyses, can be used to map topologies of other areas of
the law.
Already at this point, though, the project could foster a debate about
how meaningful judicial review in corporate law actually is. With the
help of these two articles, we now have an empirical foundation to begin
discussing critical questions such as whether we need so many standards
and whether they are meaningful. It has been well-known that the BJR
is a defendant’s best friend. Fairness and the present Article, in addition,
seem to suggest that even seemingly impressive standards that deviate
from the BJR are not plaintiff-friendly most of the time. As such, they
too present a limited core upon which to protect shareholders. As three
current and former Delaware judges tellingly observe:
Additionally, the creation of more, rather than fewer, standards of review tends
to create a false sense of doctrinal safety, encouraging boards to act in ways
that, although enabling their actions to fall into the right categorical box, does
not necessarily create the result most genuinely protective of the interests of
stockholders.90

The empirical results support their observation: Ironically, the proliferation
of standards of review in Delaware corporate jurisprudence may serve to
camouflage how defendant-friendly the jurisprudence actually is.
Two paths for reform emerge. One would simply say that corporate
law should not worry about fiduciary duties, and should really devolve
to a specialized form of contract law designed simply to facilitate economic
89. Perhaps the patterns are actually Weibull distributions, as Seth Chandler
suggests in his study of Supreme Court citation patterns. See Chandler, supra note 50, at
15. A complementary approach might be to analyze the network using rate equations
from statistical physics, to determine whether the probability of attachment to a node is
linear with node degree—as in a power law distribution—or sub-linear. See P.L. Krapivsky
& S. Redner, Rate Equation Approach for Growing Networks, in STATISTICAL
MECHANICS OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 3, 4–7 (R. Pastor-Satorras et al. eds., 2003).
90. Allen et al., supra note 14, at 869.
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exchanges.91 The logical extension of this argument would be to do
away with the facade of fiduciary duties and simply devolve to setting
default rules for arms-length contracts.92 Another would argue the
opposite: that it is precisely because fiduciary duties have been so
watered down that we have had to impose layers upon layers of mandatory
regulation, notably securities laws, to protect shareholders from corporate
insiders.93 As such, we must simplify the standards and converge to a
small number of standards that have bite. Regardless, the status quo is
long on rhetoric, but short on protection.94

91. For a discussion of this point of view, see Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s
Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 262–63 (2002).
92. Indeed, this is precisely the trend emerging in the law of unincorporated
business associations. See Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into
Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451, 452 (2006).
93. See Dibadj, Delayering, supra note 2, at 470, 472.
94. See also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content
of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 691 (2006) (“[T]he genius of
Delaware lawmakers lies in their ability to generate a thick fiduciary law without at the
same time imposing a significant compliance burden.”).
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
UNOCAL/UNITRIN OUTCOMES BY PHASE
Plaintiff-friendly

Preliminary injunction
Motion to dismiss
Summary judgment
Post-trial

#cases
19
8
2
6

%
29%
26%
11%
33%

Defendant-friendly
Std. not applied Std. applied, met
#cases %
#cases
%
19
29%
18
27%
14
45%
4
13%
7
37%
10
53%
6
33%
4
22%

Neither
#cases
10
5
0
2

%
15%
16%
0%
11%

Total
#cases
66
31
19
18

TABLE A2
REVLON OUTCOMES BY PHASE
Plaintiff-friendly

Preliminary injunction
Motion to dismiss
Summary judgment
Post-trial

#cases
12
6
1
1

%
20%
17%
8%
13%

Defendant-friendly
Std. not applied Std. applied, met
#cases %
#cases
%
16
26%
28
46%
20
57%
8
23%
7
54%
5
38%
2
25%
5
63%

Neither
#cases
5
1
0
0

%
8%
3%
0%
0%

Total
#cases
61
35
13
8

TABLE A3
BLASIUS OUTCOMES BY PHASE
Plaintiff-friendly
#cases
Preliminary injunction
Motion to dismiss
Summary judgment
Post-trial

26

3
3
2
6

%
16%
30%
15%
38%

Defendant-friendly
Std. not applied Std. applied, met
#cases %
#cases
%
12
63%
3
16%
4
40%
0
0%
7
54%
2
15%
4
25%
2
13%

Neither
#cases
1
3
2
4

%
5%
30%
15%
25%

Total
#cases
19
10
13
16

